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Draft Introduction
WITH JEMBE AND MWENC-E
On a cloth untrue . .
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
All things that are 
Are lights.
- Bertrán d’en Martie
To plan is to choose,
Choose to go forward.
- Julius Nyerere
Breaking Ground
Dr. Wagao’s retrospective perspectives on Tanzania’s development over the 
fifteen years to 1980 is a welcome addition to the literature. This is not 
simply because the amount of serious analytical and reflective writing on 
macro and sectoral development economic issues is limited - in contrast to 
that which is descriptive, polemic, short term oriented and/or narrowly 
focused.
First, this is a Tanzanian contribution. That does not make it unique but it 
is a welcome evidence of technology transfer - the proportion of expatriate 
writing on Tanzania has historically been very high. The point is not that
- 2-
only Tanzanians should write on Tanzania (or any other economy). 
Self-reliance and autarchy are not the same thing and premature reduction of 
imports cripples more than it stimulates domestic production (as Tanzania 
knows only too well at the material level). There will always be room for 
joint ventures such as the economic policy study produced under UNCTAD 
auspices (Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, Green 1981) and the Bank of Tanzania’s 20 
year political economic review (Bank of Tanzania, 1984). These cover 
approximately the same period and the three overlap as to topics. Similarly 
the occasional study with the greater distance and comparative perspective of 
one or more outsiders - like the 1981 Basic Needs Mission volume (JASPA/ILO 
1982) will always be of value - not least to Tanzanians. But very few people 
(including no large body of political economists) are primarily concerned with 
Tanzania except Tanzanians and for virtually no one else is Tanzania's 
political economic performance a day to day, inescapable, dominating reality. 
It is, therefore, a necessary part of political economic development that the 
main body of Tanzanian political economic writing become Tanzanian.
Second, Dr Wagao breaks new ground and sheds new light. In Tanzanian terms he 
uses his jembe to hoe the hard and fragile soil of Tanzanian empirical data 
and does so in full knowledge of the need to use different inputs (sources) to 
win a crop and of the unpredictable and problematic nature of the harvest.
One of the main problems with analysis in Tanzania is the quality and coverage 
of data. Because of ambiguities, gaps and conflicting estimates two dangers 
arise. One is the use of high powered techniques without adequate awareness 
that surprising results may relate to data defects or collapses under too 
energetic manipulation and not to material reality. A second is that given 
the need to select and adjust from conficting (and/or incomplete) and
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obviously adjustment requiring data there is a tendency for any author to 
select and adjust in ways which tend to confirm his original intuitions, 
qualitative judgements and hypotheses. This does not imply (or a least need 
not) intellectual sloppiness or disingenuity. The data are - in their present 
form - consistent with very different historic as well as projected scenarios 
at both descriptive and causal levels.
Dr. Wagao has provided his fellow analysts with a field of somewhat hardier 
statistical plants to use in their own work. For the non-specialist he has 
both provided a selection of the healthier cross breeds or composites 
(statistically speaking) and brought them together in one field for ready 
harvesting. Further he has done so with care not to go beyond what the data 
will bear in rearranging and manipulating. Like the Tanzanian peasant he is 
aware that fragile fields will respond, at least up to a point, to diligent 
hoeing with a jembe but transpire away their moisture and/or collapse into 
powder under deep ploughing with a heavy tractor. Further, he has done this 
task of compiling, testing, reconciling and presention to the extent anyone 
can, without basing selections and adjustments on initial assumptions, 
radically re-interpreting results to fit hypotheses, or hiding ambiguities. 
This is possible primarily because of the quality of mind he brings to the 
task but also because he - unlike for example the present author - has not 
been integrally involved in devising or applying particular strategies and 
policies and, therefore, has no sunk capital invested in them. Similarly, 
because he is broadly sympathetic to the main goals and strategies he has no 
vested interest in discrediting them from either a New Left, a Neo-Stalinist 
or a Neo-Free Market ideological stance.
And Shedding Light
But it would not be correct to imply that Dr. Wagao’s volume is simply a 
presentation of better ordered, better tested data fitted to the 1965-80 
evolution of the economy of Tanzania. It is that and as that alone would be 
very valuable. But it is more.
Having used his jembe to prepare his field and plant his crops, Dr. Wagao 
holds up a mwenge to illuminate the results. He seeks to provide an 
analytical commentary on the results revealed by the data, a causal 
explanation and a critical commentary on policy. The second and third are, 
perhaps, less fully developed than the first but are nonetheless substantial.
It is one of the strengths - not weaknesses - of this volume that it raises a 
series of questions and invites a series of challenges.
First, the collection, reworking and presentation of the data - especially
when they are then set to work at analytical description - highlights gaps 
needing to be filled. How widely this is possible in respect to the past is 
less than clear. One cannot for example produce 1961, 1970 and 1980 household 
budget surveys or refine the mid-1960s and 1970s ones to cover household
self-provisioning (so-called ’’subsistence’’ production). One may or may not be 
able to reconstruct means of payment for actual 1984-86 imports to narrow the 
range of estimates of the 'no forex' licence category from its current $150 to 
$600 million chasm. The lessons for the present and future are clearer and 
more practicable. Household budget surveys including self-provisioning (with 
clear valuation methodology allowing reestimation at shadow price for
alternative uses) are needed urgently and thereafter at five year intervals,
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if practicable with smaller, simpler annual interim 'updates'. Import and 
payment statistics should be codified to allow studies of levels and makeup by 
means of payment, e.g. allocated earned foreign exchange, export 'retention' 
fund, 'no forex' licenses, programmes or import support aid (including food 
aid), project aid and borrowings. Further some way of supplementing them with 
fringe benefit costs is needed if even such surveys are to be good guides to 
intra urban income distribution (indcluding old age security accumulation).
Second, the analytical descriptions raise rather more issues than they 
resolve. For example - as discussed below - the movements within the broad 
changes of income distribution are not all either what was expected in 
prospect, predictable in retrospect nor unambiguously explained either by the 
data or by Dr. Wagao's tentative suggestions.
This leads to a third area of dialogue - by no means all of the presentations 
interpretations of the data are complete or unproblematic. On income 
distribution Dr. V. Jamal (JASPA/ILO, 1982 and Jamal, 1985) reaches 
substantially divergent conclusions and the present author (Bank of Tanzania, 
1984) an intermediate position. Serious dialogue in this - and similar - 
cases ought to generate more light (and less heat) than previous debates.
Fourth, as noted above, some of the causal analysis and policy critique is 
tentative. Indeed in some cases the weakness inherent in not being involved 
in formulation seems to arise - the presentation of Ujamaa/Development Village 
and fiscal policy goals and instruments does not correspond very closely to 
what the government thought it was seeking to do through what instruments. 
The reasons for these differences in perception - perhaps as much as their 
resolution - deserve reflection and discussion quite separate from analysing
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and evaluating the actual results of the policies (assuming the production
results of either rural Ujamma or of villageisation can be disentangled from
weather and import strangulation).
Finally, one test of retrospective data presentation and analysis is what 
questions it raises and insights it provides about the subsequent past (in 
this case the first half of the 1980s), the present and - at least the
immediate - future. Dr. Wagao’s volume does raise a host of such issues, 
largely (and most effectively) implicitly. Perhaps the most crucial is why 
1974-76 adjustment worked and 1979-81 did not. This question is posed in the 
concluding essay but in a way less satisfying than most of the volume since it 
tends to assume that the causes of the 1979-85 economic decline were the same 
as those of 1974—76. That conclusion is not readily arrived at from the
volume’s own sources or those cited (e.g. Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, Green, 1981; 
Bank of Tanzania, 1984) since these do not cover all of 1979-86 - or even 
1979-81, nor indeed would either the Treasury or the present author agree with
it except at a very high level of generality.
With Flashes, Shadows and Flickers
To attempt a potted summary of each essay would be somewhat unfair and perhaps 
counterproductive - the reader should peruse them himself.
To write a basic attack would be inappropriate in an introduction. In any
case, the present author could not do so since he is not in basic
disagreement.
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Therefore, what follows is a selective posing of remaining ambiguities (most 
of which have not escaped the author), possible alternative readings and 
additional issues either posed but not fully treated in the essays or arising 
out of them.
The essays can conveniently be divided under four heads. Ujamaa/Rural 
Development, Income Distribution/Public Sector Wages and Salaries, Public 
Sector Enterprises and Balance of Payments Evolution (or disintegration). The 
second and third topics have two essays each.
Uj amina and Development Villages are a case in which the appearance and 
intended actions of Party and government policy at any one time and over time 
both been complex and has often been read by outsiders in terms quite 
different from what the Party and/or the bureaucracy thought they were seeking 
to do and why. This is, of course, not the same issue as what they actually 
did or its results which may have been quite different from the intentions. 
Similarly to set the tensions within the process up as a Party-Government 
clash (as some writers though not the present author do) is too simplistic - 
different trends existed within and across both Party and government.
One question which is posed only implicitly is how to read the early 1960s
Village Settlement interlude - which probably had more micro successes than
Dr. Wagao grants albeit his conclusion that it was and was perceived as a
failure at strategic level is surely correct.
Reading President Nyerere’s pre-Village Settlement speeches strongly suggests 
that at that time what he had in mind was a model far closer to Ujamma 
Villages as later developed than to the actual highly technocratic, organised
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smallholder or neo-plantation model which emerged. One interpretation of what 
happened is that the roughly outlined concept was handed over to technocrats 
(largely at that point expatriate) who did not fully understand the goals 
intended (especially the social, self-determination and mobilisation ones) and 
gave a technical set of means which inevitably contradicted the
socio-political ends sought, and in addition proved technico-economically
unviable except under special conditions.
Ujamma Villages had another history of prototypes, not examined in the essay, 
which were - or were thought to be - closer in spirit than the Village
Settlements, which it might have paid the author and would pay students of the 
villages to study. These ranged from Quaker (Society of Friends) catalysed 
community villages through the Utopian Socialist Rufiji Association (small 
villages, high turnover of members, intense participation, almost total
expatriate planning and technical leadership) to a variety of Party (then 
TANU) and youth wing settlements. What seems to have been un- or
in-adequately noticed was - then and now - that while their social and
mobilisation results were real, their productive bases were almost uniformly 
weak and usually led to their disintegration.
Another set of historic predecessors passes - as it almost always does - 
unmentioned. These are the Defence Villages set up to group households for
defence against Portuguese raids from about 1963 which by the time Ujamaa
village promotion began probably had over 500,000 members and were the 
foundation for the very rapid announcement and formation of Ujamaa villages in 
Mtwara and Ruvuma Regions. Unfortunately very little material is available on 
their size, structure or economic performance (which may have helped pave the 
way for Ruvuma’s sharp rise in grain production from the mid-1970s).
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Dne curious set of citations may deserve more attention than it receives.
Almost all studies of rural Tanzania suggest peasants at the date of the study 
were worse off than one or two decades earlier. Empirical evidence suggests 
this is unlikely. 1961—80 trend agricultural output growth was 3% to 3\% 
versus perhaps 2% to 2\% peasant household growth. Preliminary 1985-86 data 
suggest that this remains the underlying trend. Few outside observers who saw 
villages and/or farms in 1960, 1970 and 1980 have thought 1980 worse than 1960
nor was the general i960 impression that things were overall worse than in
1940. There seems to be either a neo-Greek romantic appeal to a previous 
"golden age" of the Tanzanian rural economy or a somewhat uncritical assertion 
of deterioration to attack whatever policy the analyst considers unsound on 
different grounds. Rather more serious empirical (not only economic)
research, plus surveys (using unloaded questions and unled narratives) of how 
peasants perceive changes over time, including specific and time period ups 
and downs as well as overall directions would seem desirable.
The Evolution of Party Approaches
Party strategy and policy on Ujamma Villages, as Dr. Wagao underlines, 
shifted. It did so largely in response to peasant response as perceived by 
the Party (initially largely by part time Party officers who were themselves 
full time peasants). However, the conceptual changes are perhaps not 
adequately highlighted in the author’s means centred analysis. Conceptually 
there were four phases:
a. seeking to achieve a small number of high communal consciousness and 
collective production villages to serve as pioneers (1967-1970);
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b. broadening to include a substantially larger number of villages, perhaps 
5 to 10% of rural population a year with - at least in President 
Nyerere's mind - a 25 to 30 year 'completion' perspective (1969-1972);
c. broad front” Ujamma with a much more rapid establishment of villages with 
communal and self-government elements but - initially - not necessarily 
very much collective production and what there was not necessarily in 
crop production (collective cattle raising was so fiercely opposed that 
it never was a general operational target). This was a response to a 
much more rapid expansion of village and villager numbers than 
anticipated combined with a focussing (with a 5 to 10% exception which 
were significantly both communal and collective) on collective activities 
in infrastructure building, commerce, transport, secondary economic 
activities rather than crop production (1971-197*0;
d. continuing the "broad front" approach in a lower key but making communal 
(Development) village membership compulsory and leaving the extent of 
collective activity in the villages totally to village decision 
(1973- 1976).
The overlap of dates indicates - at least symbolically - the untidiness, 
lagged communications and varying perceptions within both Party and government 
which characterised all phases of the process. For example, the 1973 Party 
Congress decision on Development Villagisation had no unambiguous target date. 
Decentralised (Regional and District) government bodies initially thought 
1974/75 - 1976/77 was the time schedule with a trial programme in the first 
year expanded in each of the following. The Party never formally contradicted
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this. Why the 1974/75 - 1975/76 timetable (which did not fit the technical 
preparations) was adopted by the Party (usually over bureaucrats’ objections 
whether on genuine technical and timing or "more work for us" grounds) in most 
Districts and Regions has never been seriously researched. The people who 
made these decisions were largely full time peasants/part time Party officials 
presumptively close to (and dependent on) their constituents and under no real 
central Party or government pressure to move faster.
The communal and collective strands in villageisation seem to be confused in 
most writing and not adequately separate even by Dr. Wagao. The first relates 
to living together partly in order to create a geopgraphic pattern consistent 
with provision of social and economic infrastructure and partly on the basis 
of the belief - especially strongly held by Mwalimu Nyerere - that people can 
be fully human only in communties larger than hamlets and more varied than 
single (even extended) families.
The collective strand relates to common production (including infrastructural 
construction). Here assessment of what can be best done jointly has been very 
weak and fitful both by proponents and opponents. This has been exacerbated 
by the Ministry of Agriculture’s fixed and abiding hostility to villages (even 
non unresolved) and the pro-village rural development/local government 
sub-ministry’s lack of technical capacity.
Self organisation in relation to village governance and to higher (larger) 
levels in the Party and government falls partly in each strand. It relates to 
the question of who was intended to control whom and what happened.
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A Question of Power
Mwalimu Nyerere saw communal self-organisation as giving groups of peasants 
the collective power to confront officials which isolated individuals families 
could never have. For him this was a key thrust of both Ujamaa and 
Development Villageisation. Most officials - especially at field and district 
levels - in prospect saw it that way too - and predictably opposed 
villageisation. Health, education and water (plus later forestry) who had 
better working relations with peasants and more to gain from spatial 
reorganisation were the exceptions. The concept of villageisation as intended 
either to increase bureaucratic control or surplus extraction - at least as an 
overt intention - smells of the smoking lamp not the torch of illumination. A 
few officials hoped for it but had grave doubts they could pull it off.
In the event the power shift has been problematic. Villages have swung the 
balance against field level officials who are far less able (or willing given 
the danger of reposting if strong objections are raised to their conduct) to 
bully or coerce peasants in groups of 1,500 than they were in handfuls 5 to 
15. As a channel of communication local Party units have, on balance, been 
strengthened - albeit regional ones, while stronger vis a vis government 
counterparts, have often singularly failed to understand particular peasant 
contexts and concerns.
But in the cases of both agricultural and administrative officials (though not 
education, health, water, forestry) the results are problematic. Acceptance 
of working for and with villages and villagers has not been won. The World 
Bank's Urna Lele had local allies in the nominally technical transformation (or 
deformation!) the intended cadre of village selected Village Manager to serve
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village council plans into a cadre of urban lower secondary school completer 
trained to manage villagers approach. The result is usually not real or 
attempted domination but inaction. In many cases the managers and other ward 
and district level agricultural and administrative staff say "Ndiyo bwana" 
("Yes, boss") both to official superiors and to villagers even when the 
demands of the two are not consistent. They then seek a quiet life by not 
acting on either set of instructions.
And One of Pay-off
This links with a real and understressed - in this essay and elsewhere - 
technical or technological problem underlying the limited collective crop 
production and medium term land utilisation and conservation challenge.
The basic reason not over 3 to 5Í of crop production has ever been collective 
and over half of that is in 5 to 10Í of all villages is neither simply 
individualism (or familialism) nor "innate conservatism" (unless that means 
calculated risk limitation). Both are real, but another factor is the lack of 
any very evident gains from collective crop production on known, accessible 
technology-input-farm management packages.
The exceptions tend to support this hypothesis. Villages which adopted new 
techniques, new crops or food production for the market for the first time are 
the ones in which collective approaches (used from the start for the new crop 
or new market oriented production) are significant. In these cases, and for 
these crops, collective not household - production - has become traditional. 
Similarly, women pooling bits of labour time to grow not for household
%- 14-
self-provisioning, but for cash to meet household expenses, have in a number 
of cases found they could gain by producing together.
Collective activity - as a somewhat baffled Party saw but perhaps did not 
understand - grew quite rapidly in a majority of pre-1974 (and less 
consistently in a majority of all) villages but was dominantly related to 
social and productive infrastructure; fuel, fruit, fodder woodlots; commerce 
(crop marketing/village shops); and - less uniformly - artisanal production 
and transport not, as expected, to crops. The resistance was often not to 
collective economic activity which clearly was likely to pay off but to 
problematic, risky shifts to collective production of known crops with no 
likely production gain in sight. That can perhaps be read as common sense 
rather than hostility to socialism or lack of accurate perceptions of reality. 
Both advocates and opponents of rural Ujamaa (narrowly defined as collective 
crop production) have tended to ignore or to brush aside this issue.
This tangle remains a priority area for research (applied research in 
particular) because it continues. How to utilise grouped, articulate, 
self-organised communities to make extension (and research) more effective; 
what management techniques would allow grouped crop production to pay off; 
where the real economic gains from collective action now exist; how to adapt 
land use and rotation to more permanent tillage and settlement patterns (where 
West African experience in areas of long established large villages shoud be 
relevant) - these are very imperfectly studied topics and what specialised
research there is has not entered into the broader socio and political
economic dialogue. Block farms - as mentioned by Dr. Wagao - are an
ideological answer facing the same basic problem as collective farms. In the 
absence of heavily subsidised mechanical cultivation, they rarely pay the
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peasant very well for additional effort and are not widely accepted. The show 
piece ’’block farm” is usually as unreal as the show piece "collective plot” - 
both are frequently public relations gimmicks to throw dust in the eyes of 
outsiders.
Income Distribution: Illumination of What?
The two essays on income distribution are arguably the most seminal of this 
volume. They flow from Dr. Wagao’s PhD thesis and his work in a cross country 
African comparative study. As he does not stress here, Tanzania looked 
different from the other cases statistically - especially in urban wage and 
salary trends toward lesser inequality.
One confusion seems to have arisen. As Dr. Wagao - and others - have noted 
the Sales Tax is progressive up to about the university graduate entering 
salary and regressive thereafter while the income tax (beginning at minimum 
wage level) is progressive over the range it affects. The combined impact is 
statistically progressive intra urban, intra rural and urban rural (see also 
Bank of Tanzania, 1984).
In this context the ILO/JASPA (1982) comment echoed by Wagao that the sales 
tax is not progressive is misleading. What the government - as accurately 
cited - has claimed is that the combined tax system is. The Sales Tax is seen 
as progressive (and pro rural because of different consumption baskets) over a 
range of incomes for which direct tax would not be practicable. From the 
minimum wage level up, income tax is seen as providing the progressive element 
first to reinforce and then to replace that of the sales tax.
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Unfortunately Dr. Wagao does not address the progressivity or otherwise of 
expenditure directly. Very few revenue systems achieve much more than 
proportionality and the Tanzanian exception is not striking in the shift in 
after tax versus pre distribution of real income because, by itself, it 
provides nothing additional to the poor. Government expenditure often is 
progressive; the question is to what degree this holds true for Tanzania.
The stress on universal access basic services suggests a redistributive 
element. So would the relatively high agricultural research, extension and 
subsidy payments except that their effectiveness for anybody is open to very 
grave doubt. Similarly Dr. Wagao's identifying state cash flow as urban to 
rural (i.e. urban receipts exceeding and rural falling short of expenditure) 
suggests that government expenditure reduces urban/rural inequality but the 
inefficiency of the agricultural (as opposed to health, education, water, 
transport) component of rural expenditure must qualify any such assertion 
until more and more articulated study is done than here or in the Bank of 
Tanzania's 20 Year Review.
On 1969 to 1976 shifts, Dr. Wagao's conclusions are now partly conventional 
wisdom and partly hotly challenged. That intra urban and urban/rural 
inequality fell is agreed. That intra rural rose is - less wholeheartedly 
(see ILO/JASPA, 1982) - agreed but that overall (urban plus rural) rose is 
seriously challenged (ibid, but also Bank of Tanzania 1984).
One problem - perhaps not made very clear by Dr. Wagao - is that the Budget 
Surveys relate to cash income only. In rural households this both overstates 
the absolute urban/rural gap and the degree of intra rural inequality (cash
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income rises as a per cent of the total as total income rises). This together 
with the question of how to value household self-provisioning - at import 
(purchase cost) or export (farmgate) prices - is crucial to answering whether 
the average (say middle 60-65% excluding top 5Í and bottom 30-35Í) of farming 
(unfortunately not identical to rural) households have greater or less real 
consuming power than the minimum wage and how the ratio is moving. Post 1980 
work (e.g. ILO/JASPA, 1982; Bank of Tanzania, 1984; Jamal, 1985) shows fairly 
conclusively that the middle rural households consuming power was perhaps 
60-70Í of the minimum wage in 1976, 100% odd in 1980 and over 133% by 1986. 
But with no post 1976 budget surveys plus the demonstrable fact urban 
households could not survive on the minimum wage (or on 1976 household income 
makeup patterns), the actual household to household comparison cries out for 
further research.
Some of the complexities of the 1969/1976 changes may relate to non-comparable 
surveys (1976 in particular has been severely criticised as to methodology and 
implementation). Others seem to be real and explicable:
a. the rise in the top 1Í of the urban income distribution’s share relates
to the lack of any real leverage over the wholly private profits, rents
and salaries of those in this category who profited from the about 5% 
average annual real growth of that period;
b. the rise in the top tranches of the rural distribution - as Dr. Wagao
suggests - relates in part to the 1976 coffee (price) boom and the less
marked parallel in tea. It may also relate to the higher proportion of 
wage and salary (non-farm) households in the rural sector in 1976 than in 
1969 as the result of extension and decentalisation of public services;
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c. the fall in the middle rural tranche’s share of rural income may relate 
to 1976 being a bad year (in output and compared to 1979 real price) for 
cotton and cashew - the probable chief cash income sources for a 
significant proportion of this sector.
What b and c suggest (especially as the cash income share of the poorest rural 
20Í did rise) is not lack of policy but that world price and weather contexts 
can swamp and household income source shifts disguise policy impact on income 
distribution.
However, the degree of levelling down embodied in Tanzania’s post 1967 rural 
strategy is often overstated. The large farmer enclave around Mounts Meru and 
Kilimanjaro has consistently had the highest per household input of state 
services and the most favourable treatment (e.g. re the Tanzania Farmers Union 
- a ’’kulak" cooperative always allowed to remain outside both the main co-op 
structure and villageisation) on organisational issues. This may have helped 
poor peasants too in an absolute sense as the TFA had a significant role in 
the greater cost efficiency of the Coffee Board than of other marketing/crop 
development agencies, but it can hardly have contributed to greater equality.
Less Ambiguity - Public Wages and Salaries
Here Dr. Wagao’s conclusions contradict conventional new left and populist 
criticism and confirm both that official policy meant what it said and - with 
some ambiguities - was implemented.
First, Tanzanian public wage and salary policy has been determined by policy
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goals - including primarily greater equality - not international or domesitc 
private levels or structures.
Second, the policy - and its implementation - date to 1961 when TANU was 
preparing its strategy for action at independence. The 1961 Adu Report 
diverged from the standard late colonial approach to equalising local and 
expatriate scales - it adopted the former and turned the difference into 
allowances particular to expatriates (or personal to citizens already on the 
"white” or expatriate scale) .
Third, the policy was implemented consistently and with a clear empirical 
impact from 1961 for the government and from 1967-69 for public enterprises 
whose wage and salary structures and - less systematically fringe benefits - 
were melded into a unified public sector structure.
Fourth, the one exception - East African Community entities before 1977 - was
the one public sub-sector in which Tanzania could not control salaries which
were in practice pegged to Kenya levels plus an "inducement" margin. This is 
a clear demonstration that Tanzania’s policy was different.
More recent studies (e.g. Bank of Tanzania, 1984) indicate that this pattern 
has continued - indeed greater stress on limiting minimum wage than salary 
purchasing power erosion accelerated real differential compression after 1974 
and especially after 1979. Adding fringe benefits to wages and salaries would
not alter this conclusion. However, apparently (see Bank of Tanzania, 1984)
it would show lesser true comparability and uniformity as both within 
government and among parastatals fringe benefit levels and generality differ 
immensely (oddly enough probably in favour of rural and small town employees
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as a per cent of base income). Some of the largest benefits - e.g. bus 
transport and cheap noon meals - are progressive but so costly relative to 
basic wages that their efficiency from the workers' points of view appears to 
need investigation.
One major challenge to left conventional wisdom emerges from the data. If the 
managerial and civil service sub-class is - as a number of Tanzanian and 
expatriate authors would have it - the dominant class why has it been so 
singularly unable to defend its economic position? Peasants, wage earners, 
urban informal workers, small capitalists, probably middle and larger 
capitalists - all have fared less badly. Nor does this sub-class see itself 
as enjoying more rather than less power in 1987 than in 1977 either absolutely 
or vis a vis workers and peasants (albeit this varies from 
institution/enterprise to institution/enterprise and may not be a uniformly 
accurate self-perception vis a vis urban workers).
Certainly a dominant class that can protect neither its economic nor its power 
base relatively or absolutely would appear to be a contradiction in terms. 
The apparently dry statistical and historic data point to a need for serious 
review and rethinking on the actual nature of dominant sub-class coalition 
(which clearly do include the managers/professionals/civil servants) dynamics 
and their change over time in Tanzania. In terms of actual allocations of 
funds and of policy priority, the Party acts as if the dominant class were 
peasants (albeit the correspondence of the actual articulated allocations and 
policies to peasant priorities as seen by peasants has in many cases been open 
to doubt). Wage and salary workers have been seen as privileged (a somewhat 
anachronistic view by now) and potentially hostile (because ill served by 
egalitarianism in power or income distribution). Why? It is hard to relate
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actual policy and resource allocation preferences to any structure of direct 
peasant power and surely too simple to relate it to the personal convictions 
of a handful of leaders.
A reverse criticism also requires further analysis. Did the reduction of 
inequality or the forms it took (as opposed to the general post 1978 declines 
in per capita incomes) have disincentive and resource misallocation effects 
which seriously reduced either current output or productive - in the broad 
sense - investment?
The data and qualitative impressions are not conclusive. Absenteeism, 
moonlighting and overt or quasi-corruption certainly rose significantly after 
1978 (from very low levels in global, let alone SSA, terms). Recurrent 
campaigns and very real social and political disapproval have limited but not 
reversed this trend (at least not before 1985-87).
But the chronology is by no means self-evidently closely correlated to 
reduction of inequality policies. These date to 1961 and, more overtly and 
coherently, 1967. Unless one argues a lagged impact, or a threshold level of 
'adequate1 differentials, it is necessary to canvass other causes. The 
strikingly obvious one is continued economic non-success after 1978, which 
whatever its causes can hardly be related significantly to reduction of income 
inequalities. The fact that the morality, morale, productivity problems of
1978-85 are widespread as to sector and income level would seem to provide 
some tentative confirmatory evidence to this hypothesis as would the fact that 
a similar trend in 1975 was largely halted and reversed with recovery in 
1976-78.
• •
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However, the chronological pattern and qualitative impressions do not totally 
dispose of the critique. By 1982 at the latest productivity of large chunks 
of the public service (as well as of their real incomes) was very low because 
supporting resources for them to do their work were simply not available. 
Arguably this did - and does - represent a misallocation of resources and one 
in fact increasing inequality nationally although not within the public 
service. Similarly, it can be argued that a higher proportion of 
performance/productivity related pay would have increased inequality only 
marginally but morale and effort substantially (always assuming efficient 
performance/productivity measures could have been devised and revised). While 
certainly correct up to a point - especially at micro level - the macro weight 
of these and related criticisms is unclear. Until they are researched in a 
systematic way all debate is likely to remain at the assertional and anecdotal 
levels.
The Rise of the Public Sector
The two essays on the public sector are perhaps less satisfying than those on 
income distribution but do nail down a number of facts especially as to 
sectoral history. In the colonial era, the directly productive public sector 
was significant well beyond public utilities but neither dominant nor the 
result of any coherent strategy. Over 1961-67 it grew moderately (and became 
more sectorally spread). This was followed by a quantum leap to dominance in 
large and medium scale economic activity (except construction) after the 1967 
Arusha Declaration and its immediate implementation measures.
The even greater dominance of public sector investment is also set out
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clearly. Here however, a peculiarity of the statistics is overlooked or not 
cited. Public sector investment in the national accounts is computed from 
answers to a postal questionnaire. Private is the residual including errors, 
omissions and failure to reply. In general, government investment has been up 
to 25Í below Development (Capital) Budget expenditure adjusted for transfers 
to parastatals. In some years parastatal investment has been even more
complete, e.g. in one year's draft statistics Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara) 
investment was in the residual private fixed investment in the gross domestic 
product calculations and its financing in foreign private direct investment in 
the draft external accounts! These weaknesses in the data do not alter - 
indeed strengthen - the conclusion of public sector investment leadership but 
do raise doubts as to whether year to year percentage shifts after the 1977-78 
leap represent altered reality or record keeping quality swings and
roundabouts.
Because Tazara was a large - in some years a fifth or more - of public sector 
investment through 1974-75, it is possible the public investment share fell 
after 1975 (as the data seem to suggest). As 1975-78 was a boom period with a 
surge of (not very efficient) private import substitution investment in 
manufacturing plus a wave of amenity and luxury house building, this would be 
consistent with qualitative perceptions. It may also relate to a question vis 
a vis post 1980 structural adjustment programmmes: does public crowd out or 
crowd in private investment?
Overall public investment clearly has led to rises in total investment - not 
least because it was more externally fundable. After 1971 it seems to have 
crowded - or pulled - in rather than crowded out private. Certainly over
1979-85 private borrowing, both for working and for fixed capital, was
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constrained by demand as it remained below the ceilings set for its nominal 
expansion. However, this might not be true if the 1985-86 recovery is 
extended and deepened. Especially at working capital level, a real choice 
might then arise especially between enterprise working and government fixed 
capital but also on the public/private fixed investment front.
Public Enterprise Organisation: A Random Walk?
The essay on public enterprise (parastatal) organisation is perhaps less 
analytical than most. It does not relate what happened in Tanzania - nor why 
- to trends and debates globally in respect to both private and public 
enterprise structuring. This is not to argue that Tanzanian practice was much 
informed by these broader contexts either, but that reflection on them might 
shed light on actions and results.
Basically of course the number of public enterprises rose because the sector 
expanded. That, however, does not explain the varying patterns of 
intra-sectoral hierarchical organisation. The first - pre-Arusha - pattern 
was one conglomerate (the National Development Corporation) in manufacturing 
and tourism plus part of agriculture, a number of public utilities (in 
transport East African not Tanzanian to 1977) and (inherited) agricultural 
marketing bodies which, like a penumbra of other public enterprises, reported 
direct to sectoral ministries as to programme and - less coherently - to 
Treasury and Planning as to finance and investment.
After 1967 both conglomeration and direct reporting (except for the largest 
production units and the financial sector in which there were only seven
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substantial enterprises) fell into disfavour. The former was believed to 
bring about diseconomies of non-specialisation (a view which investors in 
Europe and North America as well as management analysts there - but not in 
Japan and South Korea - began to favour a few years later). The latter was 
seen as preventing effective ministerial supervision because analysis units 
needed data on a limited number of groups, not dozens of units, as well as 
because functional group holding and management companies were thought to 
offer economies of scale. That too was a trend and line of argument common in 
TNC practice and management consultancy advice at the time.
Indeed external consultancy - notably McKinsey and USAID/University of 
Missouri (in agricultural marketing) - played a role in building up very 
complex holding/managing units even though their advice was usually not taken 
to as great a degree of centralisation as its authors (and parastatal 
managers) wished. Indeed in the case of industrial consultancy (advised as an 
NDC unit by McKinsey) Tanzania chose a free standing parastatal linked to the 
industrial sector and its Ministry not a reinforcement of the conglomerate, 
while in agricultural marketing the advice to amalgamate a dozen crop boards 
into one was (happily given the organisational chaos in several even on a 
single crop or group of crops front) rejected. Similarly the initial
operational level and overall sectoral amalgamation of wholesale and retail 
trading was - after the State Trading Corporation showed severe problems of 
over-extension and breakdown of internal communication - reversed. Thirty odd 
regional and specialised product enterprises were spun off with central 
oversight and planning vested in a quasi-independent, specialised Board of 
Internal Trade and financial oversight (and nominal ownership) vested in the 
Treasury.
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The pattern was neither so much of a random walk nor of unconsidered expansion 
of holding companies as it appears at first glance or in Dr. Wagao's 
historical narrative. True almost all managerial and organisational 
restructuring even (especially?) when intended to simplify seems to add layers 
and numbers of managers. Tanzania was no exception, albeit the STC 
decentralisation (an entirely intra ministerial exercise with few outside and 
no foreign based or employed consultants) did have that most unusual result. 
But there was no intent to maximise salaried posts - at least on the 
government side - au contraire there was a wish to make the sector less 
scarce, skilled professional and managerial person intensive.
The most interesting question may be why all the approaches were at best very 
partial successes and why performance within each was so very unequal (e.g. by 
the 1980s 80Í of Tanzania’s company profits and 90Í of company losses were in 
the parastatal sector, both larger than its probable share of public plus 
private company assets or turnover). Dr. Wagao suggests two answers - neither 
very clearly articulated - first that public enterprises were overcontrolled 
and/or interfered with and second that they were characterised by 
unaccountable automony to the extent of anarchy. He is almost certainly right 
on both counts albeit the most serious damage seems to have been caused by the 
second. The bulk of the losses and the worst physical performance have been 
in the agricultural marketing sector in which parastatals were - at least 
until 1980 - subject to no control and the Ministry’s Marketing Development 
Bureau (a near autonomous, expatriate expert designed and for many years run 
unit) apparently thought oversight was spelled oversite and overseeing to be 
synonomous with overlooking. Even today neither the MDB nor the Ministry 
appears to have any real strategic priorities for, grasp on what is happening 
in or will to hold accountable its parastatals while attempts to provide at
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least some of each by the Treasury are only partially effective both because 
the Treasury makes no claim to agricultural sector substantive technical 
expertise and because the parastatals' defence of autarchic non-accountability 
still enjoys parent Ministry support or, at the least, acquiescence.
But again the question is why? This is especially true because TANESCO, TPDC, 
Tanzania Posts and Telecommunications, several financial and several 
manufacturing parastatals on the whole perform well substantively, have 
reasonable to very high profits, pay attention to macro and sectoral policy 
and appear to be both accountable to and afforded working autonomy by their 
parent ministries. More research is needed but a number of points seem 
relevant. Each of these enterprises has a corporate planning and budgeting 
process; each does have - and acts on - a fairly accurate conceptualisation of 
government sectoral or sub-sectoral goals relevant to it; each possesses and 
uses a moderately reliable accounting and financial reporting system; each has 
built up a working relation of pre-action dialogue and mutual problem solving 
with its parent ministry and - usually - the Treasury before and during as 
well as after the event. This dialogue is carried on with persons (varying in 
seniority and structural location) in its parent ministry and the Treasury who 
have informed themselves about the enterprise. Line of business, degree of 
centralisation, capital intensity, presence or absence of private partners 
(absent except in some of the manufacturing cases and TDFL in which they are 
often useful) do not seem equally correlated with this "satisfactory" group as 
a whole, nor to set if off from less successful and dramatically unsuccessful 
parastatals.
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External Balance: Of Memories and Reflections
This concluding essay is the most overtly policy oriented and in some respects 
also the least satifactory of the volume. Nonetheless it has its strong 
points.
It clearly demonstrates the massive effect of base periods chosen on computed 
indices and trends - in this case export volume. When structures shift, the 
choice of weights (initial, intermediate or final) can radically alter the 
nature and intensity of trends.
The apparent counter-intuitive discovery that had 1976-78 levels of export 
volume been constant throughout the 1970s total exports would have been little 
changed is, however, not as meaningful as it may appear. It seems to be a 
statistical accident - early year excesses about balance later year deficits 
along a declining trend. By 1985 the cumulative shortfall of actuals vs 
stable 1976-78 levels over the 1970-1986 period had become very substantial.
In respect to the causes of decline the analysis is not very comprehensive. 
Price is identified but not, perhaps, explored very originally. An underlying 
problem is that over 1976-81 (as over 1972-75) the global terms of trade of 
Tanzania's main exports fell dramatically. Not surprisingly so did their 
local terms of trade (a fall exacerbated by the rising ratio of transport 
costs themselves propelled by global price shifts in both global terminal 
market and Tanzanian export prices). No amount of improved marketing 
efficiency nor export tax cuts (indeed these fell to zero or, counting 
subsidies, to negative levels in the 1980s) could have offset the global price 
swings unless Tanzania had chosen to adjust domestic prices in a direction
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contrary to world price signals. This is indeed what the IMF and - at least 
up to 1983 - the World Bank advocated but, oddly, on the grounds of following 
market signals which can hardly be a valid case. Perhaps such shifts should 
have been made on short term export volume (earned import capacity)
conservation grounds, but they would have been against market logic and
involved intervention to favour resource allocation to sectors with below 
average medium term prospects.
The greatest price effect however may be concealed by the selectivity of
available macro statistics, especially on prices and levels of overall (as
opposed to identified) marketed agricultural output. Food prices actually 
received by growers (as evidenced by scattered local market data) exploded 
after 1978 relative to those of export crops. The official grower food price 
series for grain is meaningful through 1978 and probably again in 1986. Over
1979-85 basically weather (but also input and transport bottleneck) related 
scarcities drove the actual prices (and marketed volumes) far above the
official ones. Especially for field crops and at the margin, this must have
caused some shift away from export crops - how much is unclear but probably 
more than official export crop price levels by themselves.
However, one could wish the analysis had gone beyond price. Recent studies in
the World Bank’s Nairobi office suggest that only 10Í of SSA economy 
differences in crop output performance can be explained by real (official) 
price trend divergences. Tanzania is particularly out of line with an above 
average overall output growth trend (apparently confirmed in 1985-87 with the 
return of good crop weather) but - at official prices - a worse than average 
real (official) grower price trend (relative to Cost of Living).
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Similarly the neat macro or sectoral correlations among officially marketed 
export crop and food crop output and real official producer prices may obscure 
overall reality as much as they illuminate it. As Dr. Jamal (1985) has 
pointed out, crop by crop results are frequently negatively correlated with 
real prices for substantial periods and the positive elasticities shown in 
some studies (up to 3*0 for officially marketed food crop volume) are far too 
high to be plausible. Simple price correlations do relate to a real factor 
and are easy (too easy?) to model. They seem to oversimplify even as to price 
impact and, at best, to explain a small portion of output swings.
Was 1978-198? a Replay of 1973-74?
Dr. Wagao's attempt to relate a quasi-insider analysis of the 1973-1975 
economic crisis and recovery (Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, Green, 1981) to the 
1978-8? economic crisis does not quite come off because of an apparent 
confusion or an arguably wrong assumption.
The official position - which appears to correspond to reality - is that
1973-71* shocks were different in kind (and duration) from 1978-81. If that is 
so, the explanation of the earlier period cannot usefully be tested against 
the later.
Drought was officially cited as the dominant balance of payment deterioration 
cause over 1973-75. This appears right ex post. Over 1979-86 the government 
has not argued drought was the leading balance of payments problem. Food 
import increases after 1978 accounted for perhaps 15% of the trade deficit 
growth - and much of that was met by food aid that would not have been
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available in any other form. Adding food and normal export crop drought 
related falls (including export to domestic food production shifts) might
raise the share of the trade balance deterioration to 25Í. That would be 
significant but not dominant. That is about how the balance of government 
statements put it albeit not noting the export decline impact very lucidly.
Terms of trade impact depends on the base year used and the period analysed. 
Over 1972-75 and again over 1976-1981 Tanzania's loss of real GDP from terms 
of trade shifts exceeded 10Í of GDP (by UNCTAD and by World Bank estimates 
respectively) and was among the highest in the world. 1976 terms of trade had 
shown a recovery to 1972 levels (or a bit above) but this did not mitigate the 
1978-81 shock impact. Had 1976 terms of trade continued through 1983, that 
year's total imports could have been financed by export proceeds or 25Í higher 
import levels afforded consistent with actual external resource inflows and 
with avoiding buildup of debt service and commercial arrears. The difference 
to what all observers agree was by 1983 (but not in 1976-78) an import 
strangled economy surely is significant.
Here too a data problem arises. No comprehensive post 1976 terms of trade 
data calculated from Tanzanian import and export prices exist. When the 
global analogue indices constructed by international agencies are checked 
against actual Tanzanian trade prices they appear to overstate export and
understate (dramatically) import price levels. Until the Bank of Tanzania
constructs a new Tanzania based series - and links it back to 1976 - severe
analytical problems and interpretational ambiguities will continue to plague 
this critical area.
The shock interaction of terms of trade (1977-81 falls), war (probable
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$500-700 million forex cost over 1978-82) and drought (1979-1984) was more 
massive and lasted longer than the earlier oil price (1973-74) and 
drought/grain price (1973-74) set. How much more is open to debate; but 
hardly the fact of greater intensity and duration.
Once the external and fiscal gaps had been created by the shocks, the scale 
effect meant that unless imports and expenditure rose less rapidly in 
percentage terms than exports and revenue the gaps widened. Dr. Wagao is the 
first analyst of the period to stress this point.
Here again 1975-77 was very unlike 1980-81 (viewing the key shock years as 
1974 and 1979). In the first period net real per capita financial flows to 
Tanzania rose sharply (to record levels) in 1975 and thereafter their fall was 
offset by real export price increases and a weather induced fall in food 
imports. Over 1980-81 net financial inflows (excluding arrears) rose somewhat 
but never regained 1975 total (much less per capita) real levels, food imports 
rose, real export unit values continued downward. As a result import (and 
therefore domestic manufacturing output) cuts were far more severe than in
1974-75 and were not (through 1986) reversed - as they were in 1976-78 - 
making closing the government budget gap infinitely harder (albeit over 
1980/81-1985/86 it was cut about 75Í in real terms).
Starting Points and Speeds of Response
What has been made less clear - albeit it can be read between the lines of 
some Treasury statements - is the difference in the pre-crisis fiscal and 
external reserve management position and in the speed of Tanzanian response. 
In 1972 and 1973 Tanzania - as has normally been true since 1965 except during
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the first year of a crisis - had a relatively deflationary fiscal and monetary 
stance with a recurrent budget surplus and domestic credit formation less than 
fully accommodating inflation plus real growth. External reserves had been 
rebuilt by fairly (though in subsequent terms not very) tight import 
management following the 1970-71 overheating mini crisis. Response to oil and 
drought shocks began in January 1974 and the main measures which were to 
manage the crisis and facilitate 1975-76 recovery were in hand by June 197^ 
(see Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, Green, 1981).
In 1978 matters were very different. 1977/88 - 1979/80 were, in Tanzanian 
terms at least, fiscally prodigal budgets ex ante albeit an error in 
calculating lagged 1976 beverage boom revenues rescued 1977-78 ex post. The 
recurrent budget would - for the first time in independent Tanzania - have 
been in unambiguous deficit in 1978/79 even without the war. Ex ante unwise 
and ex post mad across the board import liberalisation in 1978 (with the 
coffee boom already over) dissipated much of the high end of 1977 external 
reserves even before the war, weather and full terms of trade shocks. The war 
delayed coherent policy response as did the abortive 1979 IMF talks. In the 
event, the initial 1980-81 responses were also miscalculations. The first 
predicated on a World Bank structural adjustment which never materialised and 
the holding up of an IMF programme which was - at least without the Bank plus 
bilateral resource transfer backing - dead by the time its first and only 
disbursement was made. The second was based on an export recovery focus which 
did lead to large volume increases in 1981 but - because of continued world 
price falls - to a negligible gain even in nominal value total exports.
To say that the 1973-75 period government analysis does not apply to 1978-79 
is therefore true but not wholly relevant. To argue as Dr. Wagao does that
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part of the IMF analysis is sound is probably (depending on the part) true but 
may not shed much light.
Tanzania, The IMF and All What?
Tanzania's - or more accurately the Treasury's (see 1984-85 and 1985-86 Africa 
Contemporary Record 'Tanzania' chapters for a discussion on different strands 
in the internal Tanzania policy dialogue) - differences with the IMF were (and 
are) on timing, sequences and priority targets not on the need to restore 
external and budgetary balance and to restrain domestic credit formation 
(rather confusingly called money supply by both sides) expansion and domestic 
price inflation. The Treasury certainly gave more priority - especially 
sequentially - to fiscal rebalancing and inflation control than did the IMF 
and equally clearly wished phased (rather than shock) adjustment but the 
conceptual differences were never quite what they seemed. Before 1985 the 
Fund was prone to doubt that rebalancing required high levels of concessional 
interim external finance (as had happened in 1975) to allow supply led balance 
recovery and that vulnerable group's personal and public service consuming 
power really did matter. Even here the dialogue on additional external 
resource flows needed was more about levels and duration than whether any need 
existed.
The 1980-86 Fund - Tanzania non-agreement was not characterised by Tanzanian 
inaction. Three devaluations, a three quarter reduction in the real recurrent 
deficit, cutting DCF growth to one half the rate of inflation, a (failed) 
export growth concentration, much more prioritised (at least in principle) 
resource allocation, attempted (failed) real grower price increases, an end to
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all consumer and an attempted end to all grower (or marketing board) subsidies 
- other than research and extension - is hardly inaction whatever other 
criticisms may be made of it. By late 1984 the World Bank agreed with this 
contention, paving the way to the 1986 Bank and bilateral donor agreement to a 
broadly unchanged Tanzanian strategy of supply led, phased recovery including 
rolling policy and price revision with which settlement the Fund months later 
concurred with none too much grace.
The underlying problem over 1980-86 was that given the initial shocks and the 
scale effect no recovery was possible (without a prior total economic collapse 
and rebuilding from rubble) unless an interim augmentation of external 
transfers to rebuild import capacity to reactivate (and as the slump dragged 
on rehabilitate) productive capacity could be obtained. The 1986 Tanzania 
Structural Adjustment programme accepts that fact far more clearly and 
centrally both in form and substance than any other in SSA.
The continuing problem on this front - to which one may doubt either Tanzania 
or the Bank, let alone the Fund, has devoted its mind in any systematic way - 
is how to restore earned import capacity. Present export terms of trade are 
most unlikely to recover in the foreseeable future. Thus, even with output 
recovery and expansion, a comparable value level of new exports is needed by 
1995 to meet minumum import needs for 5 to 6Í growth to and reduce net 
resource inflow requirements to sustainable levels. What? How? With what 
regional and national import substitution? And answer comes there none from 
Bank, Fund, government or the academic community.
One could wish that Dr. Wagao and his colleagues would build on his (and other 
University) retrospective analysis of 1979-86 to address that vital cluster of
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questions. The late 1960s early 1970s highjacking of "self reliance" by
advocates of delinking from exports first and ignoring that doing this before 
domestic substitute production was in hand precipitated crises and increased 
both imbalance and external dependence has cost Tanzania very dear. It would 
be a tragedy if similar blindness to the fact that recovery - especially with 
structural shifts in production and external trade - requires more, not less, 
imports and (to be more, not less, self-reliant) more exports to earn the 
imports were to characterise late 1980s academic dialogue and public policy 
making.
Analysis, Application, Policy
One refreshing feature of Dr. Wagao’s volume is its modesty. He does not 
demand explicitly or implicitly that his analysis be acted on at once and 
uncritically. One reason the Tanzanian academic left has had so little impact 
on policy is its habit of claiming the right to decide policy on the basis of 
its superior intellectual and analytical (rarely empirically based) work 
combined with open contempt for Party leaders who, whatever their class or 
consciousness limits, are responsible to, elected by and need to be re-elected 
(indeed often fail to be re-elected) by a membership who are far more 
evidently workers and peasants than the relatively favoured university faculty 
fraction of the professional salariat (or in the university left’s own terms 
"dominant petty bourgeoisie"). Dr. Wagao prefers to use the unconstraining 
voice of orderd data and their interpretation to teach and to query actual or 
possible policies not to assert a right to neo-Platonic Guardian status.
Arguably - as some of the earlier remarks on questions raised or aspects 
overlooked may suggest - there is too little overt attention to future policy
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options and to what light the past can shed on them and especially on 
political economic issues at the who benefits, when level. This may be a gap 
which is more evident than real. Many such questions are posed at least 
subliminally, and with this skilled an author one assumes deliberately. 
Nonetheless, more explicit signposting and more assertive expression of the 
author's views (views which his careful analysis and grasp of the past have 
earned him every right to state and to expect to be listened to and reflected 
on seriously) would have been welcome.
However, that may be to use the wrong tense. Rather let us say it will be 
welcome in Dr. Wagao's contribution to the dialogue on this volume and on his 
awaited new essays and second volume. Until then the basic duty is on the 
readers - to add their jembes to his in hoeing the fields where he has broken 
ground while also extending the cultivation frontiers to neighbouring fields 
and in lighting their mwenges to dispel shadows in areas where he has cast 
initial light as well as to roll back adjacent banks of smoke or mist.
A lutta continua!
Reginald Herbold Green 
Sometime Economic Advisor 
Treasury and Honorary 
University of Dar es Salaam.
Dar es Salaam and Falmer 
February/March, 1987
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